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TS 202143/71

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
of the
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS.

BRIEFING ON BRAZIL BY CIA

Wednesday, May, 5, 1971

Washington, D. C.

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25C O N T E N T STESTIMONY OFPAGE

Richard E. Helms,
CIA; accompanied by
Milton Brown,
Latin American Analyst; and
John Maury,
Congressional Affairs, CIA

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BRIEFING ON BRAZIL BY RICHARD E. HELMS, CIA

Wednesday, May 5, 1971

United States Senate,
Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs
of the Committee on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D. C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 o'clock
a.m., in S-116, The Capitol Building, Senator Frank Church
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Fulbright,
Sparkman, Symington, and Javits.

Also present: Mr. Holt, Mr. Kuhl, and Mr. Dockery,
Professional Staff Members; Milton Brown, Latin American
Analyst, CIA; and John Maury, Congressional Affairs, CIA.

Senator Church. Why don't we commence? I will ask you
to stand and be sworn. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony
you will give this Subcommittee will be the truth, the whole
truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Helms. I do.

Senator Church. I wonder if the other gentlemen in the
room would identify themselves for the record.

Mr. Helms. This is Milton Brown, who is, works on Latin

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1 America in the agency to back me up if I get stuck and this
2 is John Maury, who deals with members of the Congress on
3 problems affecting the agency.

4 Senator Church. Very well. If you would like then to
5 proceed with your statement we will reserve the questions
6 until afterwards.

TESTIMONY OF

8 RICHARD E. HELMS, CIA; ACCOMPANIED BY MILTON BROWN,
9 LATIN AMERICAN ANALYST, CIA; AND JOHN MAURY,

CONGRESSIONAL AFFAIRS, CIA

11 Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

12 I have received from you a list of questions concerning
13 problems and issues in Brazil that are of interest to the
14 Committee. I propose to make a comprehensive statement about
15 the situation in Brazil, and in so doing will address your
16 questions.

17 A. I would like to begin by describing the origins and
18 present status of terrorism in Brazil, and the Government's
19 efforts to deal with this problem.

20 B. Then I will

21 conclude with a brief survey of how the Brazilian Government
22 operates and what we believe to be the likely course of events
23 in that country over the next few years.

II. Introduction.

25 The Government of President Emilio Medici, who took

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1 office in October 1969, is firmly in control of Brazil.

2 A. Medici has the backing of all important sectors of
3 the military, and there is evidence that his administration
4 also has the approval of major sectors of the civilian
5 populace.

6 1. The only real internal threat to the Medici
7 administration would come from the fracturing of military
8 unity, and this does not appear likely in the foreseeable
9 future.

10 B. The legal political opposition, in the form of the
11 Brazilian Democratic Movement, lacks significant popular
12 support, and is as much a part of the "system" as is the pro-
13 government party, the National Renewal Alliance.

14 C. Other sectors -- notably students and labor -- once
15 actively demonstrated their opposition to the military-
16 backed administrations that have governed Brazil since the April
17 1964 overthrow of leftist and extreme nationalist President
18 Goulart. They have, however, been quiescent since 1968.

19 1. Labor's inactivity is largely due to the strong
20 control the Labor Ministry has always had over unions,
21 particularly their finances.

22 2. Of all sectors of society, the students have mounted
23 the most vocal opposition to the post-1964 administrations.

24 a. These administrations have outlawed the traditionally
25 leftist-dominated student organizations such as the National

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1 Student Union, and arrested many student activists.

2 b. Despite these bans, Marxist student leaders
3 succeeded in organizing violent anti-government demonstrations
4 in 1967 and 1968.

5 c. Widespread arrests of student activists in 1968,
6 along with threats of expulsion from school and possible
7 prison sentences for engaging in anti-government activity
8 appear, however, to have broken the back of the organized
9 student opposition.

10 III. The rise of terrorism.

11 Since 1968, urban terrorism became a major problem for
12 the governments of Arthur da Costa e Silva (March 1967-
13 October 1969) and President Medici, whose term ends in March
14 1974. This terrorism has not, however, threatened the
15 stability of the governments.

16 A. Brazilian history has been marked by sporadic
17 episodes of violence, but organized urban terrorism is a
18 recent phenomenon.

19 B. We estimate that the number of people engaging
20 in terrorism at any one time has never exceeded 1,000 -- a
21 tiny fraction of the 93 million Brazilians.

22 C. The most serious incidents have taken place in the
23 principal urban areas, mainly the country's largest cities
24 of Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo.

25 IV. The first important incident in the chain of

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1 terrorist actions was the bombing in July 1966 of the airport
2 in the Northern City of Recife in an attempt to assassinate
3 then/Presidential candidate Costa e Silva.

4 A. This bombing, which killed two government officials
5 and injured many others, was perpetrated by members of the
6 Popular Action movement.

7 B. Originally an organization of young people which was
8 closely linked with the Catholic Church, Popular Action took
9 a sharp turn toward the extreme left and now has only the
10 sympathy of the miniscule radical sector in the church.

11 V. During the remainder of 1966 and throughout the next
12 two years, the wave of terrorist incidents, particularly
13 bombings, mounted.

14 A. Among the targets were the U.S. Information Agency
15 centers in Sao Paulo, Brasilia and Recife, the building housing
16 the U.S. Consulate General in Sao Paulo, the residence of the
17 U.S. Air Attache in Rio de Janeiro, the Peace Corps office
18 in Rio de Janeiro, the Ministries of War and Finance, the
19 home of the foreign minister, the headquarters of the Second
20 Army in Sao Paulo, and assorted police stations, railway
21 bridges, radio and television stations, banks, and office
22 buildings.

23 B. Several security officials were killed in 1968,
24 including a Sao Paulo prison guard machine-gunned with his
25 own weapon. It had been wrested from him while guarding

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1 suspected terrorists.

2 VI. The most publicized terrorist actions, however,
3 were the cold-blooded murders of two foreign military officers.

4 A. In July 1968 a West German officer studying in Brazil
5 was gunned down on the streets of Rio de Janeiro.

6 B. Then, on October 12, 1968, U.S. Army Captain Charles
7 Chandler was machine-gunned to death before the eyes of his
8 wife and 9-year-old son as he backed his car out of his yard
9 in Sao Paulo.

10 1. Leaflets left at the scene called him a "notorious
11 imperialist agent" responsible for war crimes in Vietnam,
12 and claimed he was in Brazil to teach the security forces
13 counter-revolutionary tactics, including torture.

14 2. Chandler, a West Point graduate who had served one
15 year in Vietnam, had been in Brazil nearly two years on a
16 West Point alumni scholarship (specifically, a George Olmsted
17 scholarship). He was studying at the University of S ao Paulo
18 with emphasis on Brazilian culture and the Portuguese language;
19 he was to have returned to the U.S. in November 1968 to continue
20 his studies at American University.

21 3. He was chosen as a target because, as the terrorists
22 noted, he had fought in Vietnam and supported the war in
23 interviews with Sao Paulo newspapers. On at least one occasion
24 he spoke to a Brazilian army group about Vietnam.

25 4. At the request of Ambassador Tuthill, U.S. AID Public

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1 Safety Officer Peter Ellena was assigned in November 1968
2 as a central point of contact concerning the investigation of
3 the Chandler case, and the director general of the Federal
4 Police approved his liaison with the Sao Paulo police.

5 5. Ellena served in this capacity until February 1969
6 and assisted by having the FBI make ballistics tests and
7 providing an Identikit from which sketches were made for the
8 possible identification of the killers.

9 C. Chandler's murder was a severe shock to the
10 Brazilian military because he was a fellow military officer
11 and because he was an American. His death unquestionably
12 provided a major impetus to Brazil's campaign against
13 terrorism.

14 1. Within a few months police had arrested two of the
15 three terrorists who participated in the killing. The third
16 was killed when he resisted arrest.

17 VII. Chandler's killing was planned by the Popular
18 Revolutionary Vanguard assisted by a member of the National
19 Liberating Action.

20 A. These two groups are the most important of the
21 terrorist organizations. They were founded by major figures of
22 the Moscow-line Brazilian Communist Party who left the party
23 in late 1967 because the leadership refused to endorse
24 violent opposition to the government.

25 1. Carlos Marighella, who founded National Liberating

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1 Action in early 1968, went on to become one of the most effec-
2 tive urban guerrilla leaders in Latin America.

3 a. He rose in the ranks of the Brazilian Communist
4 Party until he headed the apparatus in the State of Sao Paulo,
5 the largest and wealthiest unit of the party.

6 b. He antagonized the top leadership, however, by advocat-
7 ing the use of violence against the government and proposing
8 ties with the Castro regime and the Havana-based Latin
9 American Solidarity Organization.

10 c. At a conference in Havana in August 1967,
11 Marighella declared that the revolutionary movement in Brazil
12 would be directed against "the common enemy -- American
13 imperialism," and that the way to unify revolutionary movements
14 was through armed struggle.

15 d. His theories were incorporated into several books
16 and pamphlets, the most important being the June 1969 document
17 entitled the "Minimanual for the Urban Guerrilla." The Cubans
18 considered this pamphlet important enough to endorse and
19 reprint in Tricontinental, the magazine published by the Cuba-
20 based Asia, Africa, Latin America Peoples Solidarity
21 Organization.

22 e. Marighella stressed that terrorism "is an action the
23 urban guerrilla must execute with the greatest cold-bloodedness,
24 calmness, and decision," and he emphasized the need for
25 killing and kidnapping agents of the repressive government and

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1 of "American imperialism."

2 B. Marighella quickly put these theories into practice
3 after formation of the National Liberating Action.

4 1. The rank and file of this organization, as well as
5 most of the other terrorist groups, has come largely from former
6 student activists, intellectuals, and a few members of the
7 radical clergy.

8 2. Tactical knowledge for the groups has often been
9 supplied by cashiered military and police officers and even
10 professional hoodlums and small-time labor racketeers.

11 3. Leadership has usually been provided by former party
12 officials like Marighella and his deputy, Camara Ferreira,
13 one of the foremost Marxist theoreticians.

14 VIII. The terrorist groups have attained self-
15 sufficiency chiefly by a wave of bank robberies and thefts
16 of arms and explosives from depots and stores, along with
17 some outside assistance.

18 A. Cuba and Communist China have provided specialized
19 training.

20 1. At least 150, and perhaps well over 200, Brazilians
21 have received guerrilla training in Cuba since 1961.

22 a. Of those trained since 1967, the largest number have
23 been members of Marighella's group or other outfits sponsored
24 by it.

25 b. Several of these other individuals have been people

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1 sent abroad in exchange for four kidnapped diplomats. These
2 are the Ambassadors of the United States, West Germany, and
3 Switzerland, and the Japanese Consul General in Sao Paulo.
4 The 70 exchanged for the Swiss Ambassador in January 1971 are
5 still in Chile. Most of those exchanged for the other three
6 diplomats have eventually gone on to Cuba.

7 2. The training in Communist China has been limited to
8 about 50 members of two Peking-line groups.

9 a. Members of the first group generally went in the
10 early 1960's, the others since 1967.

11 b. The recent training appears to be largely political
12 with an admixture of instruction in guerrilla warfare.

13 B. Brazilian leftist political exiles in Uruguay,
14 Chile, Algeria, France, and a few other countries have
15 provided refuge, funds, documentation, and assistance in travel
16 to terrorists who are forced to flee Brazil.

17 1. Algeria harbors the headquarters of the Brazilian
18 Information Front, an exile group engaged in writing and
19 disseminating propaganda against the Brazilian Government,
20 and officials of the Algerian Government give these people
21 support.

22 2. In Uruguay, the Tupamaro terrorist group has aided
23 the Brazilian political exiles and is also in contact with
24 most Brazilian terrorist groups.

25 3. There are 200 Brazilian exiles living permanently in

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1 Chile in addition to the 70 persons I have already mentioned,
2 who were exchanged for the Swiss Ambassador.

3 a. Most of the Brazilian terrorist groups have
4 representatives in Chile, where they have assisted comrades
5 forced to leave Brazil, have published and disseminated
6 propaganda against the Brazilian Government, and are in touch
7 with a "Committee of Solidarity with the Brazilian Political
8 Exiles" within the Chilean Communist Party.

9 b. There have been reports of guerrilla training camps
10 operated by the Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary
11 Left at which some Brazilians have been trained.

12 IX. Although the security forces had some success
13 against the terrorists in 1969, the subversives continued to
14 cause serious problems, and by September 1969 they were ready
15 to carry out their boldest and most ambitious move -- the
16 kidnapping of a foreign diplomat.

17 A. Kidnapping of diplomats was in complete accord with
18 the guidelines of Marighella's "Minimanual", which describes
19 kidnapping as "capturing and holding in a secret place a
20 police agent, a North American spy, a political personality,
21 or a notorious and dangerous enemy of the revolutionary
22 movement."

23 B. Since the terrorists considered Ambassador C. Burke
24 Elbrick to be the principal representative of the "U. S.
25 imperialism" in Brazil, he was the ideal target for the first

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1 abduction.

2 C. The original concept for the Elbrick abduction came
3 from a group of radical students in Rio de Janeiro known as
4 the "Dissidents of Guanabara."

5 D. These students, realizing their lack of preparation
6 for such an ambitious undertaking, called upon Marighella's
7 group in Sao Paulo.

8 1. Marighella's chief lieutenant, Camara Ferreira, thus
9 became the principal architect of the abduction, and in fact
10 did most of the interrogating of the Ambassador once he was
11 captured.

12 2. At least ten other of Marighella's men had some role
13 in the operation.

14 E. As ransom for Ambassador Elbrick, the abductors
15 demanded that the Brazilian Government release 15 prisoners
16 from jails in many parts of Brazil.

17 1. The justification for this demand can also be found
18 in the "Minimanual," which states that kidnapping is used to
19 force the exchange or the liberation of imprisoned revolutionary
20 comrades.

21 2. The only bond between most of the 15 prisoners flown
22 to Mexico by the Brazilian Government to gain the Ambassador's
23 freedom was their subversive -- and in some cases criminal --
24 activity and their ties to leftist extremist groups.

25 a. Some were student members of the banned National

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1 Students' Union, others were directly involved with the terrorist
2 groups -- one had served as Marighella's personal bodyguard
3 -- while still another reportedly had a role in the Chandler
4 killing.

5 b. Once the prisoners were in Mexico, they lost no time
6 in announcing their intention to return to fight against
7 the Brazilian Government, declaring at a press conference that
8 "our promise to the Brazilian people still stands -- to
9 struggle against dictatorship, imperialism, and all forms of
10 economic exploitation and political repression."

11 c. All but two of the 15 prisoners soon left Mexico for
12 Cuba, where Fidel Castro personally gave them a red carpet
13 reception.

14 Government Countermeasures.

15 X. The Elbrick episode hit the Brazilian Government
16 and the security forces even harder than had the Chandler
17 murder.

18 A. It received international coverage and implied that
19 the government could not protect the official representative
20 of Brazil's traditional closest friend.

21 B. The security forces, angered and frustrated, became
22 determined to wipe out the terrorists who had so badly
23 embarrassed them.

24 1. One major problem they had to overcome -- and which
25 they still have not completely solved -- was jurisdictional

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1 disputes and lack of coordination among the numerous military
2 and civilian intelligence and security agencies.

3 a. In July 1969, the commander of the Second Army, who
4 is responsible for Sao Paulo State, claimed that the lack of
5 coordination among the security forces was such that only
6 ad hoc management by the army had kept things from total
7 collapse.

8 b. He made an urgent recommendation, in line with the
9 army's desire to step up its internal security role, that the
10 commanders of each of the four armies assume full responsibility
11 for and control of all security elements -- and that all-out
12 war be declared on the terrorists immediately.

13 c. Most of the army's recommendations were implemented
14 with the formation in Sao Paulo in late 1969 of the first
15 Internal Defense Operational Command, made up of officers from
16 the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Federal and State Police, under
17 the ultimate control of the local Army commander.

18 d. Each such command has two major sections: An
19 intelligence unit responsible for intelligence collection,
20 and an operations unit to raid suspected sites and arrest
21 alleged subversives.

22 e. These commands are eventually to be formed throughout
23 Brazil. The most important ones are those in Sao Paulo and
24 Rio de Janeiro, where the terrorist problem has been most
25 acute.

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1 2. The security forces were also hampered by a number
2 of long-standing shortcomings.

3 a. Historically, many high level police officials had
4 been political appointees, not career officers.

5 b. The forces, particularly in the interior states,
6 often lack adequate numbers of personnel, and the rank and file
7 are poorly paid and motivated.

8 c. The traditional tendency has been to employ a
9 basically repressive rather than a preventive approach to law
10 enforcement.

11 C. The security forces' immediate goal was to catch
12 the Elbrick kidnappers, and they soon identified 18 persons
13 directly responsible and arrested four.

14 1. Eventually 11 persons were convicted and sentence to
15 prison terms, although seven of these were tried in absentia.

16 XI. The security forces' campaign to wipe out subversion
17 scored a major triumph with the elimination of Carlos
18 Marighella in November 1969.

19 A. He was trapped and killed through information obtained
20 by Sao Paulo police from two friars of the Dominican Order,
21 who had acted in a support function for his group.

22 1. This success convinced police that they were correct
23 in their belief that some radical members of the Catholic
24 clergy -- particularly Dominicans -- had gone beyond vocal
25 criticism of the government.

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1 2. One radical member of the Catholic clergy has boasted
2 that as many as 1,000 priests (out of well over 15,000) have
3 become convinced that force is the only way to achieve the
4 needed radical social reforms, and that these priests are
5 willing to work with any ideological or political group in
6 combatting the dictatorship.

7 3. So far only about 30 have been arrested.

8 XII. The security forces continued to round up subversives
9 and learn more about the makeup and operations of the terrorist
10 organizations, but there were still groups able to carry out
11 spectacular operations -- especially kidnappings -- that
12 gained international publicity.

13 A. One of the main purposes for continued kidnapping
14 may have been to demonstrate that the security forces' campaign
15 had not destroyed the terrorists.

16 B. In any case, a second foreign diplomat, the Japanese
17 Consul General in Sao Paulo, was kidnapped in March 1970, by
18 members of the group that killed Chandler. By this time,
19 Carlos Lamarca, now the country's most hunted man, was the
20 leader of the group.

21 1. Lamarca always was an exception; he entered the Army
22 in 1955 and was one of the few soldiers of lower class origins
23 to become an officer, rising to the rank of Captain.

24 2. He made up in enthusiasm, stamina, determination,
25 and courage what he lacked in intellectual sophistication,

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1 volunteering for every tough assignment.

2 3. He became an expert marksman, and instructed bank
3 employees in stopping robberies.

4 4. In fact, Lamarca had joined the terrorists in mid-
5 1963, and was perpetrating many of the bank robberies he was
6 assigned to halt, as well as bombings of military installations
7 his unit was assigned to guard.

8 5. Lamarca learned his superiors were becoming suspicious
9 of him, and in January 1969 he and two companions raided his
10 regiment and stole 69 weapons, including machineguns and hand
11 grenades, and left the Army for good.

12 6. Lamarca quickly rose to the leadership of his
13 terrorist group, and in July 1969 supervised its biggest haul
14 -- stealing a large sum of money in cash from the mistress
15 of the late governor of Sao Paulo State, Adhemar de Barros.

16 C. As in the Elbrick case, the terrorists claimed that
17 the kidnapping of the Japanese diplomat was done "to obtain
18 the freedom and ensure the physical integrity of some political
19 detainees who are in the prisons of Sao Paulo."

20 1. Three of the five prisoners flown to Mexico as
21 ransom for the diplomat were known terrorists who had recently
22 been trained in Cuba.

23 D. The first foreign diplomat to frustrate a terrorist
24 kidnapping attempt was the U.S. Consul in the Southern City of
25 Porto Alegre, a man by the name of Curtis Cutter.

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1 On April 4, 1970, Cutter and his wife were returning
2 home from a party when a Volkswagen cut in front of his car
3 and armed men wearing masks jumped out.

4 a. As the men began advancing toward him, Cutter
5 accelerated his heavy station wagon, knocked the Volkswagen
6 out of the way, and ran over one of the terrorists. Another,
7 however, fired at Cutter as he drove off at high speed, hitting
8 him in the back.

9 2. A police investigation revealed that Cutter had long
10 been the prime target of the local chief of Lamarca's group.

11 3. The terrorists had intended to demand the release of
12 50 prisoners in return for Cutter, and to claim that Cutter
13 had confessed to being a CIA agent, which is patently not
14 true. Several

15 4. Several arrests in connection with this abortive
16 kidnapping helped the police round up more terrorists in other
17 parts of Brazil.

18 E. Nevertheless, the West German Ambassador, Ehrenfried
19 Von Holleben, was kidnapped from his car in Rio de Janeiro
20 on June 11, 1970, by armed men who killed one of the security
21 guards accompanying him.

22 1. This was a joint operation by Lamarca's group and
23 the National Liberating Action, now headed by Marighella's
24 successor, Camara Ferreira.

25 a. These two terrorist leaders also drew up the list of

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1 40 prisoners to be ransomed for the diplomat, who were flown
2 by the government to Algeria. About two-thirds of them subse-
3 quently went to Cuba via clandestine means.

4 F. In late October 1970, the terrorists suffered a severe
5 loss when Camara Ferreira was killed by Sao Paulo police, but
6 they went ahead with a fourth kidnapping on December 7, 1970.

7 1. The victim was the Swiss Ambassador, Enrico Bucher,
8 who was taken from his car in Rio de Janeiro by several men
9 who fatally shot his driver.

10 2. The operation was carried out by Lamarca's group,
11 which demanded the release of 70 prisoners, and widespread
12 publicity for the terrorists; communiques and political
13 manifestoes.

14 3. The Brazilian Government took a much harder line in
15 this case than in previous ones, dismissing out of hand all
16 demands except for the release of prisoners, and making the
17 terrorists submit several lists of prisoners before the
18 authorities found 70 they were willing to release. These were
19 flown to Chile on January 14, 1971, and they remain there.

20 a. The government also established several categories
21 of persons it was not willing to release, including anyone
22 involved in murders of kidnappings, anyone serving long
23 prison sentences, or individuals who did not want to be
24 exchanged.

25 XIII. Statements by terrorist leaders themselves and

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1 the decline in the number of incidents indicate a marked
 2 drop in the capabilities of the subversives during the past
 3 year.

4 A. Lamarca [redacted] group -- (b)(1)
 5 probably still the most important one -- was having problems
 6 surviving as an organization.

7 1. [redacted] (b)(1)
 8 [redacted]
 9 [redacted]

10 [redacted]
 11 B. In September 1970, an activist of National Liberating
 12 Action said that his organization and the other revolutionary
 13 groups were in a state of virtual collapse.

14 1. The deaths of Marighella and Camara Ferreira have,
 15 in fact, left their group without a single well-known leader.

16 C. In any case, the number of major terrorist operations
 17 has declined sharply during the last several months.

18 1. There have been no more kidnappings since the abduction
 19 of the Swiss Ambassador, and the latest aircraft hijacking
 20 attempt -- which was frustrated when police shot out the
 21 tires and sprayed the plane with foam -- was last July.

22 2. There are still bank robberies and similar acts,
 23 but their rate has slowed since early 1970.

24 XIV. Security officials [redacted] (b)(1)
 25 repression has thinned the terrorists' ranks to the point that

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1 the subversives might attempt -- indeed might be forced -- to
2 unit previously autonomous groups.

3 A. Recent reporting indicates that some of the organiza-
4 tions have discussed the formation of a Brazilian Revolutionary
5 Front.

6 B. Lamarca has been involved in these discussions, but
7 he opposed bringing in his group because the others who would
8 compose the front wanted to halt operations temporarily in order
9 to recuperate from their losses.

10 C. [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 1. Lamarca opposed the adoption of this tactic but was
15 outvoted.

16 2. A prominent Sao Paulo industrialist, Henning Boilesen,
17 was shot to death on April 15th this year by persons who left
18 a warning that Boilesen was the first on a list of those who
19 aided the Brazilian Government and U.S. imperialism and who
20 were scheduled to die.

21 a. Sao Paulo authorities have subsequently trapped and
22 killed two men involved in the Boilesen murder.

23 3. If the Boilesen killing does signify a return to
24 operations by the other terrorist groups, it could remove
25 Lamarca's objection to joining a joint terrorist front.

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1 D. In short, the terrorists are suffering from their
2 defeats at the hands of security forces and disorganization
3 caused by the loss of many top leaders, but are still capable
4 of individual killings and kidnappings, even though the cost
5 to them may be very high.

6 The nature of government countermeasures.

7 XV. The activities of the terrorists I have described,
8 and especially their Communist support, have convinced the
9 government -- and particularly the security forces -- that
10 eradication of these terrorists amounts to a "holy war".

11 A. Harsh treatment of prisoners is nothing new in
12 Brazil.

13 1. In some regions, particularly the Northeast, violence
14 is viewed as a traditional -- and often quite respectable --
15 means of punishment for deviation from the local social or
16 political norms.

17 a. In many rural areas, beatings, and, in extreme
18 cases, shootings by police and even local landowners have long
19 been a favorite method for keeping the lower classes in line,
20 and even now often substitute for imprisonment.

21 b. As long as such treatment does not result in any
22 deaths, the rural populace remains indifferent, since they
23 know it is the traditional punishment for getting caught.

24 B. But the rise of terrorism, particularly in the urban
25 centers of Rio de Janiero and Sao Paulo, has hardened the

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1 attitudes of military officers as well as civilian security
2 officials. They have come to feel that the institutions
3 responsible for preserving order were not prepared either
4 mentally or any other way to deal with urban terrorism.

5 1. They claim that Brazil is in the first stage of a
6 Communist-inspired and supported war of subversion.

7 2. The security forces also stress that since the
8 outbreak of urban terrorism, more than 50 of their number
9 have been killed and over 300 wounded, some of them defending
10 foreign diplomats.

11 3. Security officials feel that the murders, kidnappings
12 and bombings of U.S. and Brazilian public and private estab-
13 lishments, are intended to convince the Brazilian public and
14 the world of the inability of the government to maintain
15 order.

16 4. Many authorities are particularly angry about
17 having been ordered to release and fly abroad 130 prisoners --
18 many of them dangerous terrorists who had killed policemen --
19 in exchange for the safe return of abducted diplomats.

20 XVI. The security forces are not beyond using torture,
21 a practice some officials have privately justified in certain
22 cases on pragmatic grounds.

23 A. Government officials claim that torture is not used
24 if the individual supplies the desired information, but that
25 it has enabled them to get valuable information more quickly

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1 than any other method.

2 B. They insist that obtaining this information before
3 the terrorist groups know that one of their members has been
4 detailed enables the police to arrest other terrorists before
5 they can go into hiding.

6 1. The terrorists traditionally have tried to avoid
7 giving information for at least 24 hours, knowing that within
8 this time their absence will be detected and their comrades
9 alerted to go into hiding.

10 XVII. As best we can determine from available information,
11 torture is almost entirely limited to those individuals
12 suspected of engaging in terrorism, of assisting others who
13 have done so, or of having important information that would
14 enable the police to apprehend terrorists.

15 A. There is no way to determine accurately the number
16 of persons who have been tortured.

17 B. The decision to use torture as an interrogation
18 method does not appear to have been a high-level one.

19 XVIII. Recently, the security forces appear to have
20 intentionally killed certain persons under detention.

21 A. In November 1970 Eduardo Leite, an important terrorist,
22 was killed because he had been mutilated during interrogation
23 to the point that his captors could not plausibly deny they
24 had tortured him.

25 1. In a few of the cases where prisoners died while in

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1 custody, the victims were persons who would have been of
2 great help to the terrorist groups had they been freed.

3 XIX. Protests against the harsh methods of the security
4 forces have come from within Brazil and from abroad.

5 A. The subject has been aired extensively in the
6 foreign press, but censorship has limited the coverage by
7 domestic media.

8 B. Some international groups, such as the Organization
9 of American States, have officially inquired into the
10 subject.

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1 1. The Brazilian government has furnished some responses
2 to these inquiries, but has not permitted foreign citizens to
3 investigate the charges on the scene, considering that this would
4 be interference in Brazil's domestic affairs.

5 C. A human rights commission established by the government
6 has looked into some charges, but its deliberations are secret
7 and no conclusions are made public.

8 D. The potentially most damaging criticism of torture
9 has come from prelates of the Catholic Church, who have charged
10 that security forces have tortured priests on at least
11 three occasions.

12 1. The security forces, however, claim that clergymen
13 involved in subversion should be treated like any other citizen.

14 2. Top government officials, including President Medici,
15 have generally succeeded in smoothing over difficulties with the
16 church hierarchy, but additional incidents between security
17 forces and priests seem inevitable.

18 a. There is a potential for friction, particularly
19 in Sao Paulo, where the new second army commander is determined
20 to wipe out subversion, while the recently installed archbishop,
21 Paulo Arns, has already publicly charged that the security forces
22 mistreated an Italian-born priest.

23 b. Bishop Arns reportedly is preparing a document
24 severely criticizing the government on the torture issue, which
25 he intends to submit to the powerful national council of Brazilian

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1 Bishops. If it were approved an official position by that
2 body, real tension with the government could result.

3 XX. There has also been considerable international
4 publicity about the activities of "death squads" and about the
5 alleged existence of large numbers of political prisoners
6 in Brazil.

7 A. According to the Brazilian press, death squads are
8 vigilante groups composed primarily of active duty and retired
9 police officials who kill individuals in reprisal for the deaths
10 of policemen, or other persons who these vigilantes believe
11 merit death but whose crimes are not legally punishable by
12 death.

13 1. Since 1958, these squads, operating mainly in Rio
14 de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, are said in the Brazilian newspapers to
15 have killed over 1,000 persons allegedly involved in dope peddling,
16 bookmaking, or other types of petty racketeering.

17 2. Although some individual members of the death squads
18 have killed persons accused of terrorism, the death squads as
19 organizations are not known to have engaged in anti-terrorist
20 killings.

21 3. No police official has ever been convicted for crimes
22 committed as a member of a death squad.

23 a. In Sao Paulo state more than 30 policemen are on
24 trial in civil courts for killings as members of death squads.

25 4. In a poll by the Rio de Janeiro newspaper Jornal do

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1 Brazil, a majority of the persons interviewed considered the
2 death squads necessary, and considering the very high petty
3 crime rate, many citizens may consider them a public service.

4 B. The Brazilian government officially claims it holds
5 no political prisoners.

6 1. If the term "political prisoners" refers broadly to
7 ideological opponents of the government, there is in fact little
8 evidence that the government is holding any significant number.

9 2. If, on the other hand, the term refers to individuals
10 who advocate the violent overthrow of the government and
11 have engaged in subversive activity such as terrorism, or have
12 assisted others who did so, Brazilian officials say approximately
13 500 are in jail, and this figure would seem to be reasonably
14 accurate.

15 3. Large numbers of leftist intellectuals and other vocal
16 opponents of the government were rounded up by security forces
17 in Operation Birdcage last November in an effort to head off
18 an expected wave of subversion.

19 a. President Medici reportedly approved the operation
20 against a small number of identified terrorists, but was
21 dismayed when aggressive local security chiefs turned it into
22 a mass arrest of many people -- including some priests and well
23 known intellectuals -- who had only the remotest connection
24 with subversives, or no such ties at all.

25 b. Medici ordered the release of all persons against whom

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1 there was no strong evidence of active subversion.

2 [REDACTED]

3 XXI.

4 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

5 [REDACTED]

6 [REDACTED]

7 A. Kubitschek visited Washington and discussed with

8 US government officials the seriousness of the communist

9 threat in Brazil, and gave assurances that immediately after

10 his inauguration he would designate a personal representative

11 to discuss the matter.

12 B. After taking office in late January 1956, he committed

13 himself to establishing a national intelligence organization

14 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

15 [REDACTED]

16 1. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

17 [REDACTED]

18 [REDACTED]

19 a. Kubitschek had had first hand dealings with the

20 Brazilian communist party before being elected President, and

21 wary of possible communist penetration of his administration,

22 wanted an effective federal instrument which could monitor

23 and report to him about communist activity in a professional

24 manner.

25 b. The Brazilian agency, by law, was to operate under

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the authority of the Brazilian national security council, and its first and subsequent chiefs have all been army officers.

C. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

1. During the Kubitschek administration the effectiveness of the service was severely limited because of lack of funds, qualified personnel, and overall interest.

2. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

a. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

since these officers from their parochial military backgrounds had little understanding of sophisticated subversive methods used by the Soviets and local communists.

D. During the Quadros and Goulart administrations, the Brazilian service became progressively weaker, while the Communist threat to Brazil became stronger.

1. Under Goulart, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] as extreme nationalists and (b)(1)

leftist officers gained (nationalists and leftist officers gained strength in the Brazilian service.

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2. For the last nine months of the Goulart administration,

(b)(1)

XXII. After the overthrow of Goulart in March 1964, the new government's head, Humberto Castello Branco, submitted to Congress a measure reconstituting the national intelligence service with a stronger mandate.

A. In June 1964 the new service was created with nation wide jurisdiction for coordination of intelligence activities, with its own budget and provision for the recruitment of military and civilian personnel, and with its director at the cabinet-level.

B. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

the Soviets, communist dissident groups, and Castro's intelligence service.

C. Considering the growing intelligence objectives, which included a most active Soviet diplomatic mission with a large number of known Soviet intelligence officials, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] of the Brazilian services covering this important target. (b)(1)

D. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] a nucleus of Brazilian

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1 army officers would become more conversant with the real threat
2 of communist subversion, [REDACTED] (b)(1)

3 [REDACTED]
4 1. [REDACTED]
5 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

6 [REDACTED]
7 2. [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

9 [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED]
11 [REDACTED]

12 XXIII. [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

14 A. [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

16 [REDACTED]
17 B. [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

19 [REDACTED]
20 1. [REDACTED]
21 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]
24 [REDACTED]

25 2. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

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central file records system to eliminate the possibility of persons being arrested and re-arrested because the records of their case could not be located.

C. Although understanding of sophisticated foreign subversive techniques comes slowly in Brazil, [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

[REDACTED] the process continues and is making progress.

XXIV. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

A. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

B. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

C. [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

-- [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

-- [REDACTED]

(b)(1)

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[redacted]

D. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted]

E. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted]

XXV. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted]

A. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted]

[redacted]

B. [redacted] (b)(1)

[redacted]

1. [redacted] (b)(1)

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- 1 [REDACTED] (b)(1)
- 2 2. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
- 3 [REDACTED]
- 4 XXVII. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
- 5 [REDACTED]
- 6 A. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
- 7 [REDACTED]
- 8 [REDACTED]
- 9 B. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
- 10 [REDACTED]
- 11 [REDACTED]
- 12 [REDACTED]
- 13 C. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
- 14 [REDACTED]
- 15 D. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
- 16 [REDACTED]
- 17 [REDACTED]

Structure and Functioning of the Government

XXVIII. Mr. Chairman, I understand that the committee is also interested in the structure of the Brazilian Government, and the prospects for policy changes in the near term. Because of the nature of the Brazilian government, of President Medici's own personality, and of the military's suspicion of outsiders, the problem of tracking the decision making process is a difficult one. The executive branch, however, has always been

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dominant in Brazil, and especially since the 1964 "revolution."

A. President Medici himself is clearly the center of the decision making process.

1. He has proved to be a capable administrator who has carefully chosen his subordinates for their ability.

B. Ultimate authority in the Medici government, as with its two predecessors, rests with the military.

1. Political decision making in Brazil has always remained in the hands of a small elite, and the 1964 revolution established the primacy of the military officer corps within the elite.

2. The officers who led that revolution removed certain groups from the governing elite -- particularly the professional politicians who they held responsible for political and economic disorder.

3. The military is increasing its strength within the Medici administration by bringing a limited number of active duty and retired military officers into the upper levels of some ministries and agencies at the federal and state levels.

C. The military's important role is in part due to its power as an institution and in part to the President's personal preference for having around him men whose capability and reliability are unquestioned.

1. His closest advisers are military men, many of whom had served under him earlier, and the role played by these men

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1 and the organizations they head is extremely important. The
2 three most important such officers -- who are almost the only
3 people with daily access to President Medici -- are:

4 -- The director of the National Intelligence Service

5 -- The chief of the Presidential military household

6 -- The minister of the army

7 2. As director of the intelligence service from 1967
8 to 1969, Medici became thoroughly familiar with its organization,
9 functions, and personnel.

10 a. He now relies heavily on it to keep him informed
11 on developments on many external and domestic subjects.

12 D. The day to day operations of the executive branch are
13 largely in the hands of capable young colonels.

14 1. Most of these work within the national intelligence
15 service, the presidential military household, and the national
16 security council staff.

17 2. This national security council staff, like its US
18 counterpart, deals with issues affecting national security.

19 a. Practically every important policy issue that is to go
20 before the President, from minerals exploration to Brazil's
21 position on the nonproliferation treaty, receives an in-depth
22 study from the national security standpoint by the council
23 secretariat.

24 E. Military officers also head a number of important
25 autonomous executive agencies such as the state petroleum

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1 enterprise and the important superintendency for the development
2 of the northeast.

3 F. Although the active-duty officers play an important
4 role in the government, they do not dominate it to the exclusion
5 of other groups. The capinet includes some retired military
6 men, most of whom had already developed experience in civilian
7 capacities at the time they were appointed ministers.

8 1. Generally these men have been delegated a large measure
9 of responsibility and authority in their respective fields.

10 2. Some of them, notably the education minister and the
11 transportation minister, are prominent public figures with
12 their own political followings.

13 G. Medici has left the direction of the economy largely
14 in the hands of civilian experts.

15 1. Under the finance minister, Delfim Neto, who is
16 probably the most influential civilian in the administration,
17 the impressive economic growth has continued, combined with
18 improved financial stability that was initiated by the two
19 previous military-backed administrations.

20 H. The Brazilian congress acts mainly as a sounding
21 board for initiatives proposed by the executive and as a forum
22 where some criticism of government policies can be voiced
23 within informal but generally accepted boundaries.

24 I. The state governments are largely extensions of the
25 federal executive, and in the October 1970 gubernatorial

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1 elections the candidates were hand-picked by President
2 Medici.

3 Prospects

4 XXIX. President Medici desires some greater degree of
5 civilian participation in government, but he has emphasized
6 that liberalization will be realized only to the degree that
7 it contributes to achieving the primary goals of economic
8 and social development.

9 A. In his one and a half years in office he has already
10 made strides toward reactivating civilian political institutions.

11 B. The most important steps were reopening the federal
12 Congress and seven state legislatures that had been closed
13 down under President Arthur da Costa e Silva in December 1968,
14 and the holding of elections for Congress, all state governor-
15 ships, and over 1,000 municipal offices.

16 1. In the October 1970 gubernatorial balloting, the state
17 legislatures elected the 21 pro-government National Renewal
18 Alliance candidates and one opposition Brazilian democratic
19 movement members, all handpicked by Medici.

20 2. In the November 1970 Congressional elections, the
21 government party was overwhelmingly victorious, and Medici
22 interpreted this result as broad public approval of his
23 administration.

24 a. The election was marked by widespread voter apathy
25 because of the low prestige of the legislative bodies, the lack

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1 of popular appeal of the two parties, and the inability of
2 the opposition to seize upon effective campaign issues.

3 C. The president has been sparing in his use of the
4 powers given him by the 17 institutional acts issued between
5 1964 and 1969 to cancel political rights and issue other
6 punishments.

7 1. The two predecessor military backed administrations
8 had already annulled the political rights of most effective
9 political opponents, including three former Presidents and
10 three federal Senators, so that no notable cases of cancellations
11 of political rights have yet occurred during Medici's term.

12 2. Some low level government employees and military men
13 have lost their jobs and been retired as punishments under Medici,
14 but these generally appear to involve cases of incompetence
15 or corruption.

16 XXX. Medici's primary political goal appears to be the
17 formation of a new class that will replace the traditional
18 politicians.

19 A. The new breed of politicians he is thinking of
20 could be broadly characterized as "technocrats" -- men with
21 demonstrated administrative and technical competence and
22 honesty, who can gain a measure of popular support.

23 B. This "technocrat" class dominated the selections made
24 by Medici for governors, and especially for states in the
25 underdeveloped and drought-prone northeast region.

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1 C. If the Medici administration does not encounter any
2 major obstacles during its term, a civilian "technocrat" --
3 possibly one who is also a retired officer, such as the education
4 minister -- could well succeed Medici in March 1974.

5 XXXI. There are several factors that could alter this
6 cautious course toward a measure of political liberalization
7 and greater civilian participation in the government.

8 A. Some elements within the military are convinced that
9 the Armed Forces must remain in control in order to prevent
10 a return to the political and social disorder that marked the
11 pre-1964 period.

12 1. These officers were largely responsible for pressuring
13 Medici's two predecessors into cancelling political rights
14 and closing Congress.

15 2. Medici and the Army Minister have kept this group of
16 officers in line thus far, but if a major crisis arose they
17 could again develop cohesion and become a significant
18 pressure group, although they probably would not be capable
19 of toppling the administration.

20 a. Vice President Rademaker, a retired Navy Admiral,
21 sympathizes with this group of officers.

22 3. A confrontation with the church could provoke serious
23 military unrest.

24 a. While a confrontation is not likely because both sides
25 recognize the potential danger to the unity of the nation's two

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1 most important institutions, the increasing outspokenness of
2 the clergy on social issues -- including torture -- means that
3 a clash cannot be ruled out.

4 b. Such a clash would almost certainly be strictly
5 verbal, but this would not decrease its seriousness.

6 4. The terrorist groups seem to have been smashed to the
7 point that they no longer pose a serious obstacle to the
8 government, although a wave of incidents such as killings,
9 kidnappings, or bombings could cause real concern and strengthen
10 the hands of the military advocates of strong repressive
11 measures for the foreseeable future.

12 a. Some use of torture by security forces is almost certain
13 to continue so long as terrorism is regarded as a threat.

14 XXXII. An increasing trend toward nationalism seems almost
15 certain to continue under Medici and whoever succeeds him.

16 A. The President recognizes that nationalism is a theme
17 that strikes a responsive chord in the military and civilian
18 populace alike, and is using it to gain support for his
19 administration.

20 1. He is generally trying to emphasize the positive
21 aspects of nationalism, such as pride in the world champion
22 soccer team and in the vast undertaking of opening up the
23 Amazon area.

24 2. A strong threat^d of nationalism also runs through many
25 of Medici's decisions with foreign policy implications.

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1 a. One of these was the extension last year of Brazil's
2 territorial waters claim from 12 to 200 miles.

3 b. Foreign Minister Mario Gibson Barboza has announced
4 a program of visiting many Latin American countries during
5 the next year in order to demonstrate Brazil's firm interest
6 in all aspects of hemisphere relations.

7 c. Nationalism is also evident in the administration's
8 informal policy of favoring domestic participation in enterprises
9 over wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign companies, and in the
10 government's numerous initiatives to broaden foreign markets
11 for its products, particularly industrial goods.

12 d. As long as the economy continues to grow and gain in
13 strength and stability, the emphasis is likely to remain on the
14 joint-venture approach rather than on any outright restriction
15 or exclusion of foreign investment.

16 B. There remain in the military, however, elements that
17 espouse a much more narrow nationalism than does Medici, and
18 in the future they could come to power.

19 1. Little is known of their size and influence, but there
20 is no doubt that these ultra-nationalists exist and constitute
21 a factor which appears powerful enough to require constant
22 political attention from President Medici.

23 That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. I hope
24 it is responsive to the questions that were posed to me by the
25 committee.

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1 Senator Church. Most responsive review of the situation
2 in Brazil.

3 It is a little difficult to know where to begin with
4 questions. I will have a try at you and then defer to the other
5 Senators who have come in and then I am sure Mr. Holt will have
6 some questions for you after which I may have some more.

7 In connection with the review you have given us of the
8 terrorist activities in Brazil I wondered what a Brazilian
9 could do under the present regime if he strongly believed
10 in things we believe in or say we do, someone who believe
11 that the government should be elected by the people, that
12 individual rights should be respected, civil liberties should
13 be protected, what outlet does he presently have to press such
14 views.

15 Mr. Helms. Well, as you will recall, Mr. Chairman,
16 before 1964, they did have national elections and they were
17 the usual means of expressing oneself in a democratic society.
18 There are still types of elects held in Brazil to this day.
19 The press is certainly censored but not entirely, so that
20 the bits and pieces of these complaints do bubble to the surface.

21 Senator Church. Let's suppose one is not satisfied with
22 that partial censorship and partial elections, limited rights,
23 but wanted to achieve some kind of free society again does he
24 have any alternative but to, if he believes strongly enough
25 in it, to put his own life in jeopardy, does he have any

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1 alternative but to resort to force against the present
2 government.

3 Mr. Helms. Well, I think probably not because it seems
4 clear that in Brazil since 1964, it has been decided by those
5 in control that they are only going to go at their own pace
6 in working toward any liberalization of the government, and
7 that if one gets too far out of line one is going to get in trouble
8 and that is all there is too it.

9 Senator Church. The real core of the political process,
10 regardless of what the labels may be that are attached, usually
11 comes down to how the pie is sliced and Brazil has long been
12 noted for a great imbalance in the way the pie is sliced.

13 Vast numbers of people living in destitution, impoverish-
14 ment, very small numbers of people living with great wealth,
15 and a growing, though still small middle class. What is
16 this government doing about that core problem, namely, the
17 redistribution of wealth. Is this government undertaking
18 anything comparable to what is going on in Peru, sweeping
19 changes in the ownership of land or changes in taxation
20 that impose larger burdens on the rich, any of these internal
21 changes that really have to do with the core problem of how the
22 pie is sliced.

23 Mr. Helms. Well, this administration has several
24 programs going. One of them is that they are insisting that
25 the wealthy pay taxes, and this had -- and also they have raised

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1 the wages of some of the labor groups, that is not to say that
2 the gaps has been closed but at least the trend is in that
3 direction and this has had a great deal to do in halting and
4 slowing down the inflation which as you will recall was
5 rampant in Brazil 8, 9 years ago when it was going
6 up something like 140 percent a year.

7 Also highways are being built now and I had just drawn
8 on this map up there in a rather free handed way where two
9 major highways are being built to open up the Amazon area of
10 Brazil. That is one purpose. The other purpose is to try to
11 relief that impoverished drought-prone area of the northeast
12 and along that road there are going to be several cities
13 built in order to move the population out of the northeast into
14 reas of the country where their chances of making a livelihood
15 are going to be definitely increased, so that this government
16 does have programs in mind which indeed should over a period
17 of time relieve some of these pressures. Now how fast this is
18 going to be is hard to say but at least for the first time
19 a major effort is being made to open up some part of Brazil
20 other than these coast line which has been the place of maximum
21 population traditionally and historically.

22 Senator Church. Previous governments though have been
23 interested in opening up this hinterland, have they not.
24 Wasn't this the purpose of establishing Brasilia?

25 Mr. Helms. Well that was the idea of establishing Brasilia

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1 in the center of the country was sort of step one toward this
2 but the actual establishment of that city didn't do much
3 to accomplish the objectives that you are speaking about, but
4 the opening up of these highways and actually trying to move the
5 population out of the impoverished areas into areas where
6 they can certainly make a better livelihood is probably the next
7 step in this process and in my opinion a much more meaningful
8 one.

9 Senator Church. How heavily are the rich being taxed
10 now in Brazil.

11 Mr. Helms. Well I am not sure exactly what the tax rate
12 is, for example compared to our own. I do know though that for
13 almost the first time in Brazilian history they are being
14 obliged to pay. It isn't like France or other countries
15 where the rich have found a way of ducking these. This admin-
16 istration is seeing to it that they do pay up.

17 Senator Church. Is there any basic land reform program
18 under way that is meaningful, in the way of breaking up large
19 land holdings.

20 Mr. Helms. No, I don't believe so. I think
21 the emphasis in this government since they have such an enormous
22 country and with such large areas that have never been occupied
23 by anybody except maybe indians there is plenty of land there
24 if they can move the population into this land without taking
25 it away from anybody else.

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1 Senator Church. Would you characterize the present
2 government as fundamentally revolutionary government in terms
3 of internal change in the economic order or primarily a status
4 quo government.

5 Mr. Helms. Well, if you will forgive me I am having a
6 lot of trouble with that term revolution because it means so
7 many different things to so many different people under certain
8 circumstances so let me if I may just put it this way.

9 Senator Church. The way I mean it, the way I define
10 it is fundamental and far reaching changes in the internal
11 order, internal economic order.

12 Mr. Helms. I would think if the government stayed on its
13 present program and saw it through and a subsequent government
14 did it also it was going to change the government of Brazil
15 rather dramatically in a number of years.

16 Senator Church. This is the result of economic growth.

17 Mr. Helms. Yes, mainly.

18 Senator Church. Rather than structural changes.

19 Mr. Helms. I would think that is it, yes.

20 Senator Church. You mentioned in your statement that
21 traditionally in Brazil, particularly in the rural areas the
22 police have been noted for brutal methods, and then you mentioned
23 the torture that has been practiced by the federal police in
24 attempting to cope with the terrorist activities. Has this
25 traditional brutality led to considerable public ill-feeling

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1 toward the police as such in Brazil and their methods.

2 Mr. Helms. Apparently not. I would like to just for a
3 moment, if I may, point out an interesting historical aspect
4 of the way the military have operated in Brazil. As you
5 know, there have never been any real roads in that country,
6 that most transportation into the hinterland has been via the
7 rivers. This has meant that the military bases in the various
8 outlying and rural provinces have either had to be manned
9 by men and supplies flown in by airplane or else going on the
10 rivers.

11 Well interestingly enough over the years the military
12 has formed a very sound relationship with the rural population
13 because these military bases have had a means of, and have had
14 a campaign literally of not only getting into the rural country-
15 side but of sharing their salt and sugar and so forth, their
16 staples that are flown in from the big cities and as a result
17 have had a very comfortable relationship with the rural
18 community. So when some years back efforts were made to infil-
19 trate agitators and various other types of individuals in those
20 communities, as it has happened in Bolivia, in Cuba and various
21 other places, the minute a stranger showed up somebody would
22 report that to the local military garrison and the police
23 would grab that fellow within a matter of almost hours on
24 that was the end of any trouble in the countryside so it is
25 not surprising that it turned out to be urban terrorism in that

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1 country rather than rural terrorism, and therefore, as far as
2 the people in the rural areas are concerned they see no particu-
3 lar problem with this and so far as the cities are
4 concerned it is our best judgment that these repressive
5 techniques are objected to by those who have had friends, families,
6 relationships of some sort with the people who were beaten
7 up on but so far as the major part of the population is
8 concerned it hasn't caused so much as a ripple and this is
9 as I testified in connection with the death squads there seems
10 to be a kind of cynical view among the population that maybe
11 this isn't all bad to get these rascals rounded up and they don't
12 seem to worry too much about how roughly they are treated.

13 This is the sort of the net assessment in answer to your
14 question. In other words it is not a big thing.

15 Senator Church. The death squads as I understood your
16 testimony deal mainly with petty crimes and gambling and racket-
17 eering.

18 Mr. Helms. That is right.

19 Senator Church. They are not engaged or connected with
20 the effort to reach the terrorists.

21 Mr. Helms. We can find no lrelationship between these
22 two things at all, and when I was preparing this testimony,
23 and I was -- I spent a good deal of time trying to be sure
24 about my facts in the situation I put the term vigilante in
25 to the text because it was the only American term I could

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1 find to define the kind of activity these death squads involve
2 themselves in in other words they are self-appointed executioners.

3 Senator Church. Well that of course was the parallel that
4 occurred to me, too in listening to your testimony.

5 These activities are largely in the cities, the death
6 squad activities rather than in the countryside.

7 Mr. Helms. Entirely.

8 Senator Church. How much -- how would you characterize
9 the public attitude in Brazil today toward the present
10 government. Is it or do you have any objective way of measuring
11 that.

12 Mr. Helms. You know, Mr. Chairman, I don't think we really
13 do have a very objective way of doing it. There are no
14 polls taken. One gets impressions about these things, but
15 honestly, I think from a sociological point of view it is very
16 hard to make a judgment on that and I might be very misleading.

17 Senator Church. Yes.

18 Mr. Helms. I would rather assume, and I think it is
19 better an assumption, that there is among many people a
20 considerable apathy about the situation, and I
21 would relate this to the fact that the economy is indeed better
22 in Brazil and people are living better, and when people are
23 living better as you well know there is less consternation with
24 the people who are running the government, and this
25 finance minister has apparently done an extremely skillful job of

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1 not only collecting the taxes but organizing some wage
2 raises and keeping them in hand, and there has been a gain
3 in the GNP of something like 9 percent in the last
4 couple of years which is good by anybody's standard.

5 Senator Church. Can you make any assessment on the feeling
6 in Brazil, that is popular feeling, apart from official
7 feeling, toward the United States, how that trend has gone.
8 Do you have any objective basis on which you could make a judg-
9 ment as to that question.

10 Mr. Helms. Well, sir, there are certain indications
11 of this. You will recall that at the time of World War II
12 Brazil made available to the United States not only two
13 ports, Belem and Natal so that we could get our aircraft
14 staged through there on the way to Africa and Europe but also
15 some bases were set up in the hinterland of Brazil in case of
16 the real trouble in the war and so forth, and they also con-
17 tributed as you will recall a regimental combat team to our
18 forces in Italy, a team which didn't do too well at first but
19 when finally trained by the Americans turned out to give quite
20 a good account of itself.

21 The officers from that regimental combat team through
22 the years have been very pro-American and also they have been
23 very influential in the Brazilian military and in the
24 Brazilian government so there has been a very friendly relation-
25 ship.

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1 Plus the fact that [REDACTED] (b)(1)

2 [REDACTED] Brazilians basically like Americans.

3 I mean it isn't, you don't feel as though you are in all that

4 much of a foreign country. They are outgoing, and meet one

5 apparently socially with great ease.

6 There has been, I gather, something of a change in this

7 in recent years which seems to be attributable to a variety

8 of things. For one thing the Brazilian military is apparently

9 disenchanted with the fact that we won't apparently sell

10 them with the kind of armament they want and they have been

11 obliged to go somewhere else. That is one aspect of it.

12 Another that it has been, I think probably something of

13 a feeling that maybe American business gets more than its

14 share out of Brazil.

15 This is not a big thing and as I testified here, business

16 relationships are very good there for American companies.

17 But it isn't quite as war^M as it once was but on the

18 other hand it is still good, and to the extent that one can

19 measure it it isn't any particular danger if one wants to

20 put it that way.

21 Senator Church. But your answer is based really upon

22 official attitudes isn't it, the attitudes so far as you can

23 measure those who govern Brazil and the business

24 community.

25 Mr. Helms. That is the best we can do because short of

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1 actually going out and take some samples it is not possible.

2 Senator Church. You have not taken any polls to give you

3 a broader view.

4 Mr. Helms. There are none made that I am aware of.

5 But I think Ambassador Rountree is going to testify before

6 this committee is he not and he may have a better reading on

7 this than we have.

8 Senator Church. Well, let me turn to the other members

9 here of the committee. Senator Sparkman.

10 Senator Sparkman. I think you have done a very fine

11 job, Mr. Chairman, and I ^{have} very little to add to it. I do

12 want to go a little further into the economy of the

13 country. You said just a minute ago that people were living

14 better. Now how -- for several years the inflation rate in

15 Brazil was terrific. Has that been brought under control.

16 Mr. Helms. Yes, Senator Sparkman. I think that within

17 the last two or three years they finally have got it down

18 now to where it increases but at what I think one would

19 have to conceive are reasonably acceptable limits and this has

20 been accomplished by taxing people and collecting the taxes.

21 It has also been accomplished by the fact that

22 ^{bus} industry is increasing, not only what Americans have put in

23 there but Brazilian industries, their own funds and so forth

24 so when one takes the whole circle here the Brazilian economy

25 in the year 1971 has to be regarded as a relatively stable one,

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1 and it is this stability, plus wage increases for public
2 workers and workers across the board, that has helped to bring
3 about a stop in inflation and to move things forward. Now
4 this does not, however, take care of the problem that the chairman
5 was adverting to and that is there are still large numbers of
6 impoverished Brazilians up in the northeast and various
7 other parts of the country that are not benefiting from
8 this.

9 Most of this is along the coast there, Rio de Janeiro,
10 Sao Paulo, Recife and so forth where the industrial process
11 is in full flower. But I think an increase of nine percent
12 in the gross national product, which was the rate last year
13 is a significant indication of the stability of the economy
14 and the fact that it is moving foward and, therefore, more
15 people are benefiting from it.

16 Senator Sparkman. It is significant particularly if the
17 inflation has been brought under control or is being lowered.

18 You know, you speak of a lot of people not getting benefits.
19 When I look at that map and I think of the size of Brazil,
20 it certainly is no wonder that there are a lot of people who
21 are left -- how far is it from Recife.

22 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.

23 Senator Sparkman. Over to the westernmost point, how
24 many miles.

25 Mr. Helms. I think it is a couple of thousand miles.

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1 Mr. Maury. The scale is 800 right here.

2 Senator Sparkman. 800 it is probably more than a couple

3 of thousand.

4 Mr. Helms. It is probably more, 2400.

5 Senator Sparkman. At least that much.

6 Mr. Helms. And the remarkable thing about it is that the

7 country has really never been opened up. I mean there is

8 every evidence there are all kinds of raw materials and resources

9 and minerals and what have you, all kinds of things.

10 Senator Sparkman. Yes, sir, just one more question

11 and that is with reference to American industrial penetration

12 or, the location of American industry in Brazil, does it find

13 a friendly climate.

14 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.

15 Senator Sparkman. And there has been no difficulty.

16 Mr. Helms. Almost none.

17 Senator Sparkman. I don't recall that there has been any

18 taking over of American property, has there.

19 Mr. Helms. There has not been. There is a small

20 movement now, I say a small movement, it is sort of a

21 general movement in Brazil toward joint venture arrangements,

22 not totally American owned in other words, but there has been

23 no effort thus far to nationalize anything or to take away

24 American properties.

25 Senator Sparkman. Well that joint venture is something which

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1 prevails in a good many Latin American countries.

2 Mr. Helms. That is right.

3 Senator Sparkman. In fact, a good many countries of
4 the world.

5 Well I want to say to you I think you have given us a won-
6 derful presentation. I personally appreciate it,
7 Mr. Chairman.

8 Mr. Helms. Thank you, Senator Sparkman.

9 Senator Church. Thank you very much.

10 Has the present government of Brazil passed any laws
11 with respect to joint ventures, that is requiring foreign
12 investment to be made in this form.

13 Mr. Helms. No, I think this is simply negotiation. It
14 is not required.

15 Senator Church. Senator Symington, have you some
16 questions?

17 Senator Symington. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 I just have a couple. What did they do to the two
19 people, they killed one of the people that killed the American,
20 what did they do to the other two they captured.

21 Mr. Helms. Both of them were, the two that were captured
22 alive were, traded for foreign diplomats. So one is in Cuba,
23 I believe. The second one, after having been traded outside
24 the country came back, and I believe was killed when they were
25 attempting to capture him.

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1 Senator Symington. They are pretty near just going to
2 run this Italian who took the plane from here, the Italian
3 government is going to run him for the Senate pretty soon,
4 their senate, not ours.

5 (Laughter)

6 [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

8 [REDACTED]

9 [REDACTED]

10 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

12 [REDACTED]

13 [REDACTED]

14 Senator Symington. [REDACTED]

15 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

16 [REDACTED]

17 [REDACTED]

18 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

19 [REDACTED]

20 Senator Symington. My fourth question, this Medici govern-
21 ment, that is a rough name to start off with, you appear to be
22 pretty solid about that government. You seem to think he is
23 doing all right.

24 Mr. Helms. Well, I think he is there to stay, let's put
25 it that way.

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1 Senator Symington. Was he an army man at any time?

2 Mr. Helms. He always has been an army man.

3 Senator Symington. He always has been an army man.

4 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, he came up through the ranks
5 of the army.

6 Senator Symington. Final question on the same subject,
7 you say there could be a successor to him in 74, is that
8 because he is not permitted to run again?

9 Mr. Helms. Yes.

10 Senator Symington. I see. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

11 I might ask one more question, which is how is Brasilia
12 doing. I went down there with Senator Fulbright a few years
13 ago and they were creating an artificial town. Is it
14 prospering?

15 Mr. Helms. It is gradually filling up but very slowly.

16 Senator Symington. Thank you.

17 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

18 Senator Church. I see both Senator Fulbright and Senator
19 Javits are reading over the statement. Would either of you
20 like to question the witness at this time.

21 Senator Javits. I would like to ask a question or two.

22 I am glad he is here and I have been down there and have
23 had the privilege of meeting all the presidents excepts the
24 last one who took office at the time of Castello Branco.

25 Do you know, Mr. Helms, whether or not any effort has been

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1 made to ascertain what level these elections really reach or
2 can you tell us the conclusion of your agency as to whether
3 they really mean a thing in democratic terms. They make a
4 big thing about the fact that people are elected to congress
5 and these elections are going to continue and therefore we
6 are wrong about the fact there is no democratic government in
7 Brazil.

8 Mr. Helms. Well, sir, I think that the way the elections
9 are conducted these days would by our stand not be what
10 we would call proper elections because the candidates that are
11 being run are hand-picked before hand.

12 I mean you have a choice but you don't have all that much
13 of a choice.

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1 Senator Javits. The level, as I understand it, goes to
2 the Congress, the state governors are no longer elected.

3 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, they are elected just this past year
4 but they were hand-picked candidates.

5 Senator Javits. The same thing.

6 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.

7 Senator Javits. And from the point of view of the future
8 is there any movement at all, solidly led in Brazil, for a
9 constitutional form that would include constitutional guarantees
10 for the individual or do you not see any evidence of any
11 "prospective" movement?

12 Mr. Helms. There has not been that much movement in
13 that direction, certainly.

14 Senator Javits. Is it your judgment or the judgment of
15 your agency if a national election were held and Medici
16 was the candidate, that he would be elected?

17 Mr. Helms. I think probably yes.

18 Senator Javits. So that you have a rather strained
19 monolithic dictatorship by consent, is that not true, in
20 Brazil?

21 Mr. Helms. I think you put it pretty well.

22 Senator Javits. That is what the Brazilians contend and
23 I know them well and they really contend that this is, you
24 would get the same result by an election and that you cannot
25 have an election anyhow, because the military will not let you

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1 but that substantively, it does not matter. That is really
2 what they contend, so is -- dictatorship by consent.

3 Senator Church. May I just ask following that logic. If
4 substantively it does not matter if you would get the same
5 result anyway, then why the refusal on the part of the
6 Government to permit the elections to take place? If this is a
7 real accurate assessment of the situation then why the need
8 of the government to refuse elections?

9 Mr. Helms. It is a very good question, Mr. Chairman, and
10 I really do not know quite how to answer it. They used to have
11 wide open far-ranging, perfectly ordinary, democratic
12 elections for the President and when they focused on Mr. Goulart
13 they did not like what they focused on and they just changed
14 the system.

15 Senator Javits. Mr. Helms, if I may, just as a matter
16 of interest, tell you what the Brazilians what I know, the same
17 fellows who come to the same conclusion that Mr. Helms does.
18 They say they are not afraid of an election. What they are
19 afraid of is what will happen after there is an election. You
20 see they point out that Jan Goulart was elected nobody
21 had the remotest idea that he would go the way he did. They
22 point out when the fellow who ran away, what was his name?

23 Mr. Helms. Quad Ross.

24 Senator Javits. When Quad Ross was elected nobody had
25 the remotest idea this would produce tremendous instability

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1 because he departed from the presidency and, therefore, that
2 the military are concerned about a democratic system rather than
3 who is going to get elected if they allow them to vote. That
4 is what I am just doing, is giving you their explanation.

5 Now, Mr. Helms, one last point, if I may. Could you, if
6 you, as far as your agency knows, could you state in so many
7 sentences what your agency understands the policy of the United
8 States toward Brazil to be [REDACTED] (b)(1)
9 [REDACTED]

10 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
11 [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED]
13 [REDACTED]
14 [REDACTED]
15 [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED]

17 Senator Javits. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
18 [REDACTED]

19 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

20 Senator Javits. And as far as you know, it is the State
21 Department that would have to answer my question?

22 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.

23 Senator Javits. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

24 Senator Church. [REDACTED] (b)(1)
25 [REDACTED]

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1	[REDACTED]	(b)(1)
2	[REDACTED]	
3	Mr. Helms. [REDACTED]	
4	[REDACTED]	(b)(1)
5	[REDACTED]	
6	[REDACTED]	
7	Senator Church. [REDACTED]	(b)(1)
8	[REDACTED]	
9	Mr. Helms. [REDACTED]	(b)(1)
10	[REDACTED]	
11	Senator Church. [REDACTED]	(b)(1)
12	Mr. Helms. [REDACTED]	
13	[REDACTED]	(b)(1)
14	[REDACTED]	
15	[REDACTED]	
16	[REDACTED]	
17	[REDACTED]	
18	[REDACTED]	
19	[REDACTED]	
20	[REDACTED]	(b)(1)
21	[REDACTED]	
22	[REDACTED]	
23	[REDACTED]	
24	Senator Church. [REDACTED]	
25	[REDACTED]	(b)(1)

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1 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

2 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED]

3 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

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6 Senator Church. [REDACTED]

7 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

8 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

9 Senator Church. In dealing with the terrorist threat in

10 Brazil, I gathered from your statement that the Army was

11 principally in charge, is that correct?

12 Mr. Helms. In this fashion, that these committees

13 which were established, made up and composed of various

14 members of the armed forces and the police, the ultimate man

15 in command is the army commander in the various military

16 districts of Brazil, of which there are four, there are four

17 armies, and that army commander is the fellow who is in

18 charge of these things in each area ultimately so that in that

19 sense the army is in charge of it, if you want to put it that

20 way.

21 Senator Church. What role do the police play in the

22 anti-terrorist activity? Is it the Federal Police?

23 Mr. Helms. It is supposed to be the local police and they

24 have been melded into these units. In other words, the units

25 have been composed of Army, Navy, Air Force and police, and

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1 as I pointed out in the testimony, this is one of the problems
2 that has confronted the Brazilians that there has not been
3 all that much coordination so this is a mishmash.

4 Senator Church. It was testified to yesterday that we
5 had furnished the police in Brazil with sizable amounts of
6 equipment through the so-called Public Safety program, and that
7 this was known to the people of Brazil, in fact, some
8 publicity had been given to it. Do you not think that the
9 connection within the government and the governed is most
10 sensitive and most delicate when it comes to the law
11 enforcement, that this connection between the people and the
12 government is probably the most intimate that exists, is it
13 not?

14 Mr. Helms. I would certainly agree.

15 Senator Church. [REDACTED]

16 [REDACTED] (b)(1)
17 [REDACTED]
18 [REDACTED]

19 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

20 [REDACTED]

21 Senator Church. [REDACTED]

22 [REDACTED] (b)(1)
23 [REDACTED]

24 [REDACTED] I am just trying
25 to apply what would seem to me to be a common sense judgment.

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1 Unless Brazilian people are very different from American people
 2 unless their nationalistic attitudes are different from our
 3 own, it would seem to me this would be a natural cause for
 4 resentment. If a foreign government came to this country and
 5 supplied training and equipment for our police and
 6 our people, if Brazil maintained such a program in this
 7 country, I would imagine, it is not hard for me to imagine
 8 how deep the resentment to be.

9 Why do you feel that basic attitudes beyond the officials
 10 with whom we deal would be so different in Brazil?

11 Mr. Helms. I have no way of answering this question,
 12 and I suppose it depends on what sector of the population one
 13 is adverting to. Kubichek was a President elected by a
 14 popular mandate in Brazil and he was the one who started all
 15 this. He thought that there was a threat to the stability
 16 of the country [REDACTED] (b)(1)

17 [REDACTED] But how that comes off on various sectors
 18 of the population I just could not answer.

19 Senator Javits. Could I just complete one thing, Senator
 20 Fulbright would you allow me, just to clear up this electoral
 21 question, Mr. Helms.

22 On page 55 of your statement, which I have just gotten
 23 to, if you will be kind enough to turn to, I do not want to
 24 impede Senator Fulbright, you say in October 1970 in
 25 gubernatorial balloting the State Legislatures, so there were

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1 no election for governors, they were elected by the State
2 Legislatures.

3 Mr. Helms. That is right.

4 Senator Javits. That is very important, that is what I
5 was getting at. That is what I understood.

6 Mr. Helms. I am sorry.

7 Senator Javits. That is all right. So the State
8 Legislatures were elected through the popularly and the Federal
9 Congress were elected popularly but these were hand-picked?

10 Mr. Helms. That is right.

11 Senator Javits. One other juridical fact you say the
12 President's term expires 1974?

13 Mr. Helms. That is right.

14 Senator Javits. By what authority?

15 Mr. Helms. He has a five-year term.

16 Senator Javits. Given by whom?

17 Mr. Helms. I believe that is the Brazilian Constitution.

18 Senator Javits. But how was he elected?

19 Mr. Helms. His election takes place by the National
20 Assembly.

21 Senator Javits. Were all these forms gone as to Medici?

22 Mr. Helms. Well, the form that was -- he was not popularly
23 elected. He was elected by the National Congress.

24 Senator Church. I thought the Congress was closed down,
25 and for a long time suspended.

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1 Mr. Helms. But in this particular case he was indeed
2 elected by the Congress.

3 Now, there is a strange arrangement that is used here.
4 First, the military were polled, the military officers, to
5 find out who would be the candidate acceptable to the military.
6 It turned out to be Medici, and he was then elected by the
7 Congress.

8 Senator Church. This was the newly-elected Congress
9 that you are referring to?

10 Mr. Helms. No, this was before that. This newly-elected
11 one has been done, has come in since, I believe. Is this
12 right, Mr. Brown?

13 Mr. Brown. That is right?
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1 Senator Javits. What we are trying to find out, I think,
2 both Senator Church and I and it would interest Senator
3 Fulbright too, legitimacy, is he technically a legitimate
4 President? I mean, that would include the old over character
5 of the previous Congress. I believe it very important that we
6 have some record of that fact yes or no. Well, you can give
7 us a memo on that, Mr. Helms. I am not trying to cross
8 examine.

9 Mr. Helms. May I ask my associate, Mr. Brown?

10 Senator Javits. Whatever it is just so we know, Senator
11 Fulbright is it all right? I am so sorry to interrupt.

12 Mr. Brown. The military picked Medici then because
13 Costa e Silva had a stroke, the military then after they had
14 selected Medici called Congress back into session, the other
15 Congress, and that Congress elected Medici and Admiral Rademacher
16 as President and Vice President under the Institutional
17 Act that had been established since the revolution of 1964.

18 Senator Javits. Then established by whom?

19 Mr. Brown. By the people who made the revolution in 1946.

20 Senator Javits. In other words, the Institutional Act was
21 an imposed act, it was not a constitutionally legitimate act,
22 was it?

23 Mr. Brown. That is right.

24 Senator Javits. Imposed by the military junta?

25 Mr. Brown. Yes.

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1 Senator Javits. And the Congress, was that a holdover
2 Congress or was it a constitutional holdover, did it have a
3 right to be there?

4 Mr. Brown. That was a constitutional holdover Congress
5 that had been cancelled earlier but then called back for this
6 election, that is right.

7 Senator Javits. So that the legitimacy of this government
8 is premised upon the acts of the military junta which staged
9 the revolution.

10 Mr. Brown. Yes.

11 Senator Javits. Is that correct?

12 Mr. Brown. Yes.

13 Senator Javits. Your answer is, yes.

14 Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.

15 Senator Javits. And you adopt that answer, Mr. Helms?

16 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir.

17 Senator Javits. Thank you.

18 Senator Church. Senator Fulbright.

19 Senator Fulbright. This boggles me. I mean, ever since
20 they began talking about protective reaction strikes I find
21 myself completely befogged by the semantics. What in the world
22 is a dictatorship by consent, I mean? What does the word
23 dictatorship mean to you?

24 Mr. Helms. Dictatorship to me means a government that
25 is run by a dictatorship or a group of individuals who

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1 constitute themselves as sort of a collective dictatorship.

2 Senator Fulbright. What does the dictatorship by consent

3 mean?

4 Mr. Helms. Sir, this is general for Senator Javits'

5 term.

6 Senator Fulbright. He asked you that, is that right,

7 and you said, yes.

8 Mr. Helms. I was trying to get a description out.

9 Senator Fulbright. I am just trying to pick your brains.

10 What do you mean by a dictatorship by consent?

11 Mr. Helms. Well, in the colloquy that Senator Javits and

12 I were having he used this phrase to explain or describe what

13 I believe to be the case if one had free elections in Brazil

14 tomorrow you would have gotten the same fellow President.

15 Senator Fulbright. Providing the same fellow had control

16 of the electoral processes.

17 Mr. Helms. Well, the military in Brazil has always had

18 some control of the country.

19 Senator Fulbright. You mean they never have had what we

20 would call free elections?

21 Mr. Helms. Well, let us just say that everybody who

22 was permitted to vote voted.

23 Senator Fulbright. I am not trying to bedevil you.

24 Mr. Helms. No, no.

25 Senator Fulbright. And I am not trying to say that this

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1 country could really function under any other system. I doubt
2 if they could. I am not critical of dictatorships. Really, what
3 bothers me, and it does not bother me that we are friendly
4 with Franco, I have never once said a word in public that I
5 thought this ought to be abolished, that we ought to have
6 another system reply for the fact I do not believe the Spanish
7 have the traditions nor the background that they could, if it
8 was given an absolutely open free election, I think it
9 probably would be a chaotic situation, they would fall upon
10 one another, they are not accustomed to accepting a decision
11 made in this fashion and for many reasons, and I am perfectly
12 willing to accept the fact that this is the system that suits
13 their particular temperament and degree of political maturity,
14 et cetera. So, I do not quarrel with that and I do not in Brazil.
15 I doubt if they could do any better. It is not because I am
16 trying to impose it but what does bother me is when the
17 State Department, the Government spokesman comes up and says
18 the principal reason now we are fighting and continuing the
19 war in Vietnam is to give these people a chance at a free,
20 what was the language he used yesterday, you were there, a
21 free, I have got his statement, a new phrase in place of
22 self-determination. I asked him why in the world do you keep
23 changing this terminology, you used to say self-determination,
24 now they developed a little nicer sounding phrase something
25 about free choice but that is like saying giving them a dictator-

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1 ship by consent, I mean. What it means is there is a certain
2 hypocritical aspect of our whole rhetoric that bothers me very
3 much and I think is bothering many people. Why not just let
4 them go on and have their dictatorship by consent?

5 Mr. Helms. I think, Senator Fulbright, the description
6 of the Brazilian Government is itself a military dictatorship.

7 Senator Fulbright. Sure, why not and I am not complaining
8 about it. I doubt very seriously and I doubt that we could
9 give them any other kind of system to be better so I think
10 we ought to leave them alone. I am a neoisolationist so far as
11 that is concerned, to intervene in Brazil to give them the
12 kind of elections you have in New York or Chicago or anywhere
13 else --

14 (Laughter)

15 -- but what bothers me is this ambivalence that appears and
16 continues to appear in our governmental policy which has nothing
17 to do with your responsibility and yet you come here and
18 I have not the slightest reason to question the way you have
19 described it, but I have a terrible time about our policy,
20 why in the world if we are assisting this kind of government
21 here, we assist the one in Argentina, at least we are not doing
22 anything to upset it, it is a very similar one, is it not?

23 Mr. Helms. Yes.

24 Senator Fulbright. Very similar one, well, Paraguay is
25 a little more ancient in its establishment, it is similar, is

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1 it not?

2 Mr. Helms. Yes.

3 Senator Fulbright. The one in Peru, is it not similar,
4 now what are we doing fighting to give the people of South
5 Vietnam a free election? That is the import of what these
6 people say was the other day the acting Secretary of State,
7 and it just absolutely leaves me dumbfounded is what in the
8 hell they use such rhetoric. Cannot we ever get some agree-
9 ment or what are we arguing over? You see what bothers me.
10 You accept it here, the Greeks, our Government is over there
11 giving them aid, I do not know, we are giving them a hundred
12 million dollars this year, that is a dictatorship by consent.

13 Mr. Helms. I would not say that.

14 Senator Fulbright. Well, take the election in Korea, there
15 was obviously no possibility of defeating Park. He has control
16 of the machinery, he has got everything in it going, he has
17 all the control of the money, they went through the routine,
18 I half way suspect to try to kid the American people, to justify
19 our continued aid, they have it coming up with a program of
20 750 million and it is easier, more palatable to get it through
21 the Congress if they say yes we have a free election, this
22 fellow was elected. He was not elected in the sense that the
23 Americans use the word elected, is that not true?

24 Mr. Helms. That is true.

25 Senator Fulbright. Is there no possibility, I mean, have

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1 we got to always fool the American people? I think this is
2 one of the reasons you get people, poor pathetic, bedraggled
3 kids, they do not know what they are doing but they sense there
4 is something phony about our whole posture in this whole
5 business and sooner or later it gets to be extremely embarrassing.
6 It is embarrassing to me now because I think I am a party to
7 a fraud, a continuing fraud, and yet I am not about to upset
8 Mr. Park. I am not trying to recommend our system to anybody,
9 but apparently the American people think we are taking the
10 word, just like the christians took the cross and the Moslems
11 took the sword, and we are doing it all over the world and
12 in Vietnam is what we come up with.

13 Can you think of any better reason than this idea that
14 their sealing and giving us the other day about we are continuing
15 this fight, continuing this war to bring to South Vietnam
16 the chance for a free society.

17 Mr. Helms. I doubt that you are going to have a free
18 society in South Vietnam or any place in Asia for sometime.

19 Senator Fulbright. Then, what the hell are we fighting
20 for?

21 Mr. Helms. I thought the purpose of it was to give the
22 South Vietnamese Government a chance to exist as a viable
23 state, that is all.

24 Senator Fulbright. What do you think is going to happen
25 to them? I mean, viable state, that is not the way, what do

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1 you mean by a viable state? They are not going to disappear
2 from the face of the earth if we pulled out together. It
3 is just a question of what kind, who, what faction rules it,
4 is it not? Neither one of them is going to democratic in the
5 sense that New York is democratic, will it?

6 Mr. Helms. Certainly not.

7 Senator Fulbright. What difference does it make whether
8 it is Faction A or Faction B? I am serious about it. This gets
9 me puzzled to beat hell. I do not know why we are there, and
10 we raised this question, the Senator from New York is the best
11 lawyer we have in these parts.

12 Senator Javits. Free.

13 Senator Fulbright. There is a regime, a government
14 committed to law and order. And we have a constitution, he has
15 got a very important bill to bring us within the Constitution
16 I am unable to find in the Constitution the authority to
17 prosecute a war to bring a foreign country the right to a free
18 election or a free determination of which faction rules them.
19 It does seem to me there is the ultimate in disregard for the
20 fundamental law of the country which is the Constitution. There
21 is not anything in the Constitution to authorize us for us or
22 you to do what you are doing or for the President to do what
23 he is doing without any resolution, declaration of war or
24 anything to go abroad and to try to insure a foreign country to
25 have the right to choose which faction it wants. The truth of

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1 the matter is we like Mr. Thieu and Mr. Bunker is committed
2 to him so we are really fighting to keep Mr. Thieu in office. If
3 you just forget about the Rhetoric, that is the fact of the
4 matter, but of course, this is not palatable to the American
5 public so we have to continue to fool the American public by a
6 lot of high sounding language like dictatorship by consent.

7 Mr. Helms. Senator Javits, you got me in a jam.

8 Senator Javits. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
9 it is the witness' answer.

10 S Senator Fulbright. You said yes, that is what it is.

11 (Laughter)

12 It is like these protective reaction strikes. What is the
13 difference in that and a bombing raid?

14 Mr. Helms. None, that I know of.

15 Senator Fulbright. But really, how can we get off of
16 this kind of rigmarole that keeps going on and on and I do not
17 understand it. I am getting more and more boggled in my mind
18 of what in the hell do we do. We just act like we are trutha-
19 tized. We are just going down this road without any reason. It
20 is utterly unconstitutional. When he said I am there to protect
21 our troops everybody more or less accepted it. I could see
22 that, that is within his reasonable construction of the
23 Constitution. But the other morning the Under Secretary did
24 not say that. Of course, he cannot say it because going into
25 Laos was not to protect anybody's troops except the CIA, they

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1 were trying to help your troops maybe but they did not put it
2 on that ground.

3 Mr. Helms. Did not help much.

4 Senator Fulbright. I read in the paper that you are in
5 the heroin business this morning.

6 Mr. Helms. In the paper?

7 Senator Fulbright. It was this morning's paper, was it not?
8 Did not Jack Anderson in this morning's column, say that
9 the CIA Air America is one of the principal transporters of
10 heroin, I did not mean to bring this up this morning.

11 Mr. Helms. It is all right, sir, but it is not true.

12 Senator Fulbright. But it says, I think it is in the
13 morning paper says you are one of the principal, your Air
14 America is one of the principal means --

15 Mr. Helms. Sir, there is a defense of that.

16 Senator Fulbright. What?

17 Mr. Helms. It just plain is not true.

18 Senator Fulbright. Steele is preparing a report that will
19 allege Air America aircraft are being used to transport the
20 drug from Northern Laos to the Capital City of Vientiane. How
21 do you know it is not true?

22 Mr. Helms. I cannot prove the negative, Mr. Chairman,
23 but we awakened to this problem many years ago, and --

24 Senator Fulbright. I do not want to belabor you on that.
25 That is bad and it has a terrible effect upon the people but

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1 it is not nearly as bad as getting us so confused we do not
2 know what we are doing in Vietnam and their way to end it
3 because we do not know what we are trying to achieve. If
4 you do not know what your objective is you never know when you
5 achieve it, do you, and Mr. Ky says it will take 15 to 20
6 years to achieve what his objective is, which means he would
7 like to have us continue to pay their bills for 15 to 20
8 years, which is not very difficult to understand. He would
9 like us to leave and continue to pay his bills, is that not a
10 fair statement?

11 Mr. Helms. Nice work if you can get it.

12 (Laughter)

13 Senator Church. He has quite a record of success.

14 Senator Fulbright. I think it is deplorable and shameful
15 and all that, they kill people they do not like but every
16 dictatorship has always done that and they will continue to
17 do it, there is nothing we can do about it, is there?

18 Mr. Helms. Nothing that I am aware of.

19 Senator Fulbright. Nothing we can do about it. It is
20 interesting to know, it is depressing to know we are support-
21 ing people who have no respect whatever for human life but
22 that is the way the world is, and we are doing it all over
23 but I think we ought to minimize it. I must say I do not think
24 we ought to be a party, a principal to it. I think we ought
25 to let them go their way. There is nothing we can do about it

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1 in my opinion, about changing the government, nothing in my
2 opinion. If we tried we would fail or we would be as bad. You
3 have no good alternative. I do not either and I think that is
4 true of all these. I think the Greeks, what I object to is
5 not -- I do not plan to think we ought to throw them out, I
6 do not think we ought to be their principal ally, give them
7 a lot of money so they make it impossible, almost, we do, for
8 the Greek people, if they had enough desire and willingness to
9 restore self-government, we really are allies with the Colonels
10 when we do what we do. I do not think we ought to be allies
11 with them, although I do not think we can go in and throw
12 them out. This is for the Greek people and this, I assume
13 from the Government's view, is neoisolationism. I do not
14 call it that.

15 Senator Church. There is the same question that arises
16 coming back to the matter of Brazil, we have given two billion
17 dollars to this government.

18 Senator Fulbright. I do not think we ought to do it any
19 more. We ought to cut it out.

20 Senator Church. To finance its programs, to strengthen
21 its fiscal position in the country, and the thing that seems
22 to me we forgot entirely in the process of administering
23 foreign policy and making these nice delicate judgments on
24 the question of internal threats and Communist subversion and
25 this sort of thing in playing the game of geopolitics, I think

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1 we have forgotten entirely how American policy has come to look
2 to the American people. That is the reason for the ferment in
3 this country, and we are going to have more and more of it.
4 When a foreign policy becomes so detached from the traditional
5 values we have stood for as a nation that we are pumping
6 vast sums of money into the support of governments that are
7 there and the ethics that we are taught to believe in then
8 young people begin to wonder what we are doing in the world
9 and what we are standing for that matters and this is the root
10 source of the great disillusionment of the young people toward
11 the Government and toward the leaders in this country. And
12 that is a graver source of weakness for our own society and
13 its future than most any of these threats that we are so
14 consumed with abroad.

15 We have not given you a chance to ask any questions,
16 Pat. Have you some you would like to ask?

17 Mr. Holt. Just a few. You have already covered most of
18 what I have. But to follow up your colloquy with Senator Javits
19 about General Medici's probability of winning an election if
20 he had an election, do you think Kubichek might beat him or
21 come close if Kubichek were allowed to run?

22 Mr. Helms. I have no way of knowing. I really, I am not
23 ducking the question, I just do not know.

24 Mr. Holt. This is, of course, a highly speculative
25 subject we are talking about.

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1 Mr. Helms. Yes.

2 Mr. Holt. But I thought the record ought to show there
3 is a body of opinion in Brazil to that effect, whether it is
4 correct or not.

5 [REDACTED]
6 [REDACTED] (b)(1)
7 [REDACTED]
8 [REDACTED]
9 [REDACTED]
10 [REDACTED]

11 [REDACTED]
12 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

13 [REDACTED]
14 Mr. Holt. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

15 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED]
16 [REDACTED] (b)(1)
17 [REDACTED]

18 Mr. Holt. [REDACTED]
19 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

20 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

21 Mr. Holt. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

22 [REDACTED]
23 [REDACTED]

24 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED]
25 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

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1 [REDACTED]

2 Mr. Holt. Do you see any future for a future for the

3 third party organized in Brazil about a month ago?

4 Mr. Helms. I would think not.

5 Mr. Holt. On page 4 you estimate that the number of people

6 engaging in terrorism at any time has never exceeded 1,000.

7 Do you have an estimate of how many there might be in these

8 terrorist groups at this time?

9 Mr. Helms. No, but -- I cannot possibly come up with

10 a figure, but I think the number is relatively small now. It

11 is way below a thousand.

12 Mr. Holt. You said Cuba and Communist China have provided

13 specialized training for the terrorists. Have they provided

14 any other kind of help, financial, material?

15 Mr. Helms. Well, oddly enough -- let me answer that

16 question this way, we do not know of any particular financial

17 assistance but interestingly enough, the terrorists through

18 various of their raids and robberies and so forth, have

19 collected themselves quite a sizeable financial fund, so I

20 do not think they need very much help from outside or at least,

21 have not needed it up to now.

22 Mr. Holt. You mentioned at some point the cash terrorists

23 got from the mistress of the late Adhemar de Barros. I

24 think the Committee might be interested if you would elaborate.

25 Mr. Helms. All right. I originally had in my testimony

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1 what the sum of money was that this fellow acquired when he
2 robbed the mistress of this leader and I took it out of the
3 testimony because it seemed so implausible to me that I thought
4 my credibility with the Committee might be damaged by the
5 figure. It is alleged to have been \$2,400,000 in one trunk.

6 Mr. Holt. What did they do with the trunk after they got
7 it?

8 Mr. Helms. So far as I know they took some of this
9 money and put it in the Cuban Embassy and then used it as a
10 drawing account. When they needed money they just used the
11 Cuban money as a bank. He would go down and pull out the money
12 they needed and then got a receipt for it and so forth, so
13 that was the way they protected it.

14 Mr. Holt. Was it the Cuban or the Algerian Embassy?

15 Mr. Brown. It was Algerian.

16 Mr. Helms. Was it Algerian? I am sorry, my mistake.

17 Senator Fulbright. I have in the record that language
18 so it will be clear what I was talking about Mr. Irwin. I
19 have got his written prepared statement the other day. He
20 uses this kind of language. He says: "Or to bring out
21 our men in a way which would leave the South Vietnamese a
22 reasonable chance to determine their own future." That is the
23 first page. The last paragraph where it summed it up and
24 I want the record to show it because it makes it a little
25 clearer what we are talking about. "The Administration

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1 continues to believe that the policy of withdrawing our forces
2 as the South Vietnamese become more capable of assuming the
3 burden of their own defenses together with the President's
4 statement that all our forces will not be withdrawn until our
5 men are released provide the best prospect of bringing all our
6 men in prison or in the field out of Vietnam in a way to
7 give the South Vietnamese a reasonable chance to survive as
8 a free people."

9 Survive as a freepeople, and I was trying to interpret
10 this in the light of a free people. Is a free people a people
11 who are under a dictatorship by consent, are they free
12 people?

13 Mr. Helms. Not in my definition of the word.

14 Senator Fulbright. In mine, either. I do not know what
15 this means and yet there is not the slightest chance in this
16 area there is likely to be a free election than there is in
17 Brazil or in Argentina or in Korea, or in any of these other
18 places it strikes me, and this strikes me as very confusing
19 to those of us who are supposed to be concerned with
20 policy making. What is the objective in South Vietnam, and
21 then if this means a free election as we use the term here,
22 that we actually do have a choice, that it is free, that
23 existing government does not control the electoral process,
24 if that is the objective, and that is the way they use the
25 term, what in the world is the constitutional justification

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1 for waging a war without any authority from Congress or a treaty
2 or anything else on such a basis? It is clearly in violation
3 of the Constitution. It does not say anything about protecting
4 the lives of our soldiers, and this is the latest statement
5 the other morning from the Acting Secretary of State and I
6 asked him specifically when we started, are you speaking for
7 the Administration, which, of course, he said yes, he was,
8 and this is their policy. And you are a party to it. You are
9 going around here and you are doing all sorts of things support-
10 ing this illegal policy. You are an accomplice in an illegal,
11 unconstitutional act, are you not? This is a serious question.
12 If we are committed to law and order does not included abiding
13 by the fundamental law of the country which is the Constitution.
14 It is no less effective than a police statute, is it, in your
15 opinion? Are we as committed to support the Constitution
16 as we are any statute passed by the Congress?

17 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, I would think so. I am not a
18 constitutional lawyer, Senator Fulbright.

19 Senator Fulbright. No, but you have got experts on your
20 staff, you have got constitutional lawyers, historians,
21 scholars, generals, what in the world, you have got the greatest
22 aggregation of brains anywhere around.

23 Mr. Helms. Maybe I should go back and consult with them.

24 Senator Fulbright. Would you, I wish you would give me
25 a memorandum on the constitutional basis for the waging, for

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1 the continuing to wage the war in order to give the people of
2 Vietnam an opportunity to be a free people. Would you have
3 a memorandum on that subject?

4 Mr. Helms. I do not think that is really my proper
5 function.

6 (Laughter)

7 Senator Church. The memorandum, I might say, Mr. Chairman,
8 we have had from the Executive Branch on that subject, seems
9 to support the theory that the President has an inherent power
10 as Commander-in-Chief to conduct war at his pleasure.

11 Senator Fulbright. Well, at his pleasure. They originally
12 though, started out on the basis that Cambodia and Laos was
13 to protect our soldiers' lives in the field where he found
14 them. That is, I think a fairly acceptable, nobody raised any
15 fuss about it. I want one other question before I have to go,

16 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

17 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

18 Senator Fulbright. Do you have any reports from there
19 about what happened during the early days of the insurrection,
20 rebellion or whatever you want to call it?

21 Mr. Helms. Yes, sir, certainly.

22 Senator Fulbright. Have you any objection to making those
23 available to the Committee just the factual accounts of what
24 happened?

25 Mr. Helms. The reports. I would like to see in what form

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1 they are. I am not even sure about this. Why, is there some
2 problem in connection with what occurred there?

3 Senator Fulbright. Yes. We had a hearing on this the other
4 day, and we were trying to get what happened, the extent,
5 the reason I am interested, I will give you this over-
6 simplified background. They had an election, a national
7 election, and it was supposed to be a free election, and
8 apparently was too free because the election went against the
9 government in East Pakistan, this Awami League or whatever
10 it is, won.

11 Mr. Helms. Won overwhelmingly.

12 Senator Fulbright. So the government did not accept that,
13 is that not right? They sent in an army to in effect, to massacre
14 the leaders and they are reported to have arrested the leader
15 of the League, and to have killed a lot of people. Now, is it
16 true or not that they did, that the Army in going into Dacca and
17 other places did kill a lot of people indiscriminately.

18 Mr. Helms. I do not think there is any doubt that a
19 lot of people were killed.

20 Senator Fulbright. This is what I wanted, just the facts
21 of the case. Is there any reason that you would not care
22 to give us the report of the nature of the attack that was
23 brought by the Army?

24 Mr. Helms. Would a memorandum from me in which I
25 described the history of this thing and what actually happened?

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1 Senator Fulbright. What took place.

2 Mr. Helms. Because I think, sir, there were some inter-
3 mediate moves there between the election and the establishment
4 of constitutional convention, and that this business of what
5 the movement of the troops into East Pakistan came after
6 several political manipulations took place, that I think rather
7 sets the stage for what subsequently happened, not the killing,
8 I am not talking about that, but I mean there is a question,
9 as I recall all this, that the government of Pakistan, in
10 West Pakistan, was attempting to work out some kind of an
11 arrangement about this constitutional convention, that the
12 leader in East Pakistan declined to sit down with him. But
13 let me get this, I mean, let me put it down in a piece of
14 paper because I am not all that clear about it.

15 Senator Fulbright. The Pakistani Ambassador, why I bring
16 this up today, called me this morning and he said very
17 urgent that I see him. You know how they do, it is not, of
18 course, but he thinks it is, and it would be very useful.

19 Mr. Helms. Let me get you a memorandum.

20 Senator Fulbright. If I could have what your factual
21 case is, I do not want your opinions or anything like that but
22 it is purely for my information because he is coming to see
23 me, I think it is tomorrow or the day after. He called up.

24 Mr. Helms. Would you tell me precisely, sir, so I know
25 what my deadline is?

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1 Senator Fulbright. Call my office and ask Kitty when
2 I agreed to see the Ambassador from Pakistan, I have forgotten
3 whether it is tomorrow or the next day, and the reason, I
4 guess, he said he wants to come to see me, I do not know
5 why, I imagine he wants to tell me the Pakistan Government
6 did not use American arms and they were fully within their
7 rights to invade and do the things in East Pakistan and maybe
8 they were. I am not asking you to make a judgment on political
9 rights but I am interested in what went on there.

10 Mr. Helms. I will get you a factual statement.

11 Senator Fulbright. How many people did they kill, if you
12 have an estimate?

13 Mr. Helms. We have no estimate on that because there is
14 something which has been extraordinarily difficult to follow
15 because, you know, there is such a large concentration in that
16 country and the people are all over.

17 Senator Fulbright. They excluded all foreign press?

18 Mr. Helms. That is right.

19 Senator Fulbright. So there was nobody to report it.

20 Mr. Helms. And they had most of the diplomats holed
21 up in their consultates in Dacca so there was nobody to
22 advise us.

23 Senator Fulbright. This is what makes it difficult, we
24 would like to know what you know about it.

25 Mr. Helms. You will have it, sir.

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1 Senator Church. Has it been any information from the White
2 House we are going to send troops in if we do not give the
3 people of East Pakistan a reasonable chance for self-determina-
4 tion?

5 Senator Fulbright. Well, this is another thing, here is
6 a situation where they had an election and they did not
7 accept it and Rahman, he said he was going to be separatist,
8 from what he did say he wanted local autonomy for local affairs
9 but would leave foreign and defense affairs for the government
10 in Islamabad, this is what I understand, a high degree of
11 state rights in this country, that he wanted a high degree of
12 states rights because he felt they had been imposed upon in
13 taxes and other ways and that they were not acceptable to
14 Yahya, and this is a very rough estimate of what I understood.
15 But again, it is not my purpose certainly, to intervene. All
16 of this has a bearing upon what in the world are we doing in
17 South Vietnam, because here was an election, here was a
18 people in East Pakistan, which is a thousand miles from West
19 Pakistan, who said they would like a high degree of autonomy,
20 they would like an opportunity, as the Secretary said, for a
21 degree of freedom, and so our Government says it is an internal
22 matter, we are not going to be involved having already given
23 the arms to Pakistan, which they used to impose their will on
24 East Pakistan. Does this not occur to you there is a little
25 bit of sort of schizophrenia in this policy that we are following

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1 in Vietnam compared to the other countries? Is there a split
2 personality or not?

3 Mr. Helms. Maybe one learns by experience.

4 Senator Fulbright. Have we not learned enough in South
5 Vietnam?

6 Mr. Helms. I have no way of knowing that.

7 Senator Fulbright. Yes, you know, and you ought to be
8 helping us along with the President to show him the light.
9 Go ahead.

10 Senator Church. Have you any further questions?

11 Senator Fulbright. Thursday at 3:30. It is tomorrow.

12 Mr. Helms. I will have it at your office by lunch time
13 tomorrow.

14 Senator Fulbright. Basic facts.

15 Mr. Helms. I understand exactly what you want.

16 Senator Fulbright. As far as you know what happened.

17 Mr. Helms. I will do it.

18 Mr. Holt. [REDACTED]

19 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

20 [REDACTED]

21 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

22 [REDACTED]

23 Mr. Holt. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

24 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

25 Mr. Holt. The National Intelligence Services of Brazil

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1 that you referred to, is it purely a domestic operation or does
2 it also concern itself with foreign intelligence?

3 Mr. Helms. It is a domestic operation. I believe in its
4 charter it is supposed to have some external abilities or
5 authorities but it does not amount to anything.

6 Mr. Holt. They are concerned with the Soviet Embassy and
7 Cuban Embassy and places like that. [REDACTED]

8 [REDACTED] (b)(1)

9 Mr. Helms. [REDACTED] (b)(1)

10 Mr. Holt. That is all I have got.

11 Mr. Helms. Thank you, Pat.

12 Mr. Holt. Thank you.

13 One thing more I will give you this tear sheet from a
14 previous report of April 19th, so for the record you can
15 comment on what is there.

16 Mr. Helms. All right.

17 Mr. Holt. So I will not be accused of not asking you about
18 it.

19 Mr. Helms. All right, fine.

20 (The information referred to follows:)

21 (COMMITTEE INSERT)

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1 Senator Church. Well, Mr. Director, thank you very
2 much for your testimony. It has been helpful to us, and we
3 appreciate the long session you have put in with us this
4 morning.

5 Mr. Helms. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

6 (Whereupon, at 12:20 o'clock p.m., the hearing was
7 concluded.)

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